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Summary Findings
This paper aims to better understand emigration pressures in migrant 
sending countries by looking at the determinants of the propensity to 
migrate at the individual level. The analysis is based on survey data 
from Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia collected by the European 
Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006. Within this context the study focuses 
on (i) the self-selection of migrants in terms of skills and (ii) the impact 
of selective immigration policies on the migration process. The paper 
finds that migration pressures, or the intent to migrate, are not subject 
to  any  self-selection.  However,  immigration  policies  exert  a  strong 
out-selection that is likely part of the reasons why positive selection is 
found in many studies. Further, the study confirms that the EU attracts 
comparatively lower skilled migrants than other destinations. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The migration of skilled people has become a hotly debated issue in both sending and 
receiving countries. In the case of the European Union (EU), for example, efforts are under way 
to attract skilled labor through increasingly selective immigration policies. In order to 
counteract a trend in immigration statistics that has left the EU with a considerably higher share 
of low skilled immigrants than other  regions, particularly the United States (US), policies 
favoring immigration of highly skilled workers have been introduced in a number of European 
countries, including France, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Moreover, in 
September 2007, Franco Frattini, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom, and Security, 
proposed the introduction of a unified “Blue Card” which aims at attracting highly skilled 
migrants from outside the EU.  
But effectively selecting immigrants and protecting borders against low skilled 
immigrants is difficult. Pressures to migrate are immense, due to enormous economic 
inequalities between sending and receiving countries, especially in South-North migration. 
Even less influence can be exerted by sending countries, as there is hardly a way to establish 
restrictive  emigration  policies. Hence, it is in the interest of both groups of countries to 
understand the factors that determine the decision of individuals to migrate. It is important to 
learn more about the characteristics of people who decide to move, why they go abroad and 
where. Understanding these determinants may ultimately help to better match supply and 
demand of migrant labor, to predict migrant flows and to boost the success for migrants in the 
host country. 
Against this background this paper will look at the determinants of the propensity to 
migrate at the individual level. Geographically, it will focus on four sending countries that 
neighbor the EU: Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia. The analysis will be based on survey 
data collected by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006. The survey was designed 
to study migration intentions and the characteristics of migrants (and non-migrants) in sending 
countries and thus provides a unique micro data set. The approach to analyze characteristics is 
based on the theory of intentions established by the work of Ajzen (1988). In addition, the 
detail in the ETF data allows to expand Ajzen’s model and to define degrees of likelihood of an  
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individual to migrate and to indentify individuals who are just before migrating. Thus, the 
paper will also contribute to evaluating how well intentions predict migration behavior. 
Within this context the study distinguishes two steps in the migration process of the 
individual. The first step where migration intentions are formed and the second where those 
intentions are actually realized. The study will analyze the self-selection of migrants in terms of 
education levels, other skills and in terms of integration in their home labor market. The second 
step refers primarily to the role that migration policies play in restricting (or allowing) actual 
migration, but also to the degree to which the individuals are determined to actually move 
abroad. Similar to the first step, selection—that is the out-selection—of migrants will be the 
primary interest of the analysis.1
The paper finds that the selection of migrants is  indeed not clear-cut. There is no 
evidence that migration pressures are subject to any selection pattern. This means that it is not 
the highly skilled in particular who want to go abroad. Rather, unemployment and network 
effects are important determinants for migration intentions. For the second step of realizing 
migration intentions, the study finds a robust positive out-selection. Education seems to be 
indeed a factor that is associated with overcoming migration restrictions. In terms of the 
destination choice of migrants, the study clearly confirms the trend that the EU receives less 
skilled migrants than other destinations. There is no evidence for selection of those heading to 
the EU while there is positive selection for those heading elsewhere. This implies that 
migration policies are in principle effective in selecting migrants, but such policies have not yet 
been successful in the EU. It may be a slow process to change this pattern due to strong 
network effects that uphold the flow of less skilled migrants. 
 Other factors that may play into selection patterns such as 
network effects or country specific characteristics will be also considered. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the theory of intentions, its application to 
migration and the literature of selection will be reviewed. Subsequently, the data and conditions 
in the survey countries will be presented and the models for estimation introduced. The results 
of the estimations will be presented in section four. The study concludes with a summary of 
findings and elaborates on policy implications that result from this research. 
                                                 
1 The analysis will use the terms self-selection and out-selection to distinguish between selectivity that occurs in 





2  THEORY OF MIGRATION INTENTIONS AND 
SELECTIVITY 
2.1  Migration and Intentions 
Most economic literature on migration agrees that the main driving forces behind 
migration are differences in (expected) net returns between sending and receiving countries. 
Thus, a migrant holding certain characteristics and skills weighs expected gains in the potential 
host country against costs associated with migration and gains that can be obtained when 
staying in the home country (Harris and Todaro 1970, Hatton and Williamson 1998, Massey et 
al. 1993).2
Gains are widely defined by wage differences. Nevertheless, these differences are not 
the only important driver of migration as is demonstrated by the fact that the poorest countries 
are not the ones sending the largest numbers of migrants (Massey 2005, Hatton and Williamson 
2005, Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Consequently, gains may also originate from 
other inequalities in the political, economic, social, demographic and geographical environment 
(e.g. freedom, protection, better health care); or generally better living conditions than in the 
origin country.  
 Some literature also stresses that this migration decision is not only evaluated by the 
migrating individual alone but rather by the whole family following a strategy of risk 
diversification (Stark and Bloom 1985, Stark 1991, Katz and Stark 1986, Lakshmansamy 1990, 
Findlay 1987).  
Costs associated with migration vary and may include the actual migration costs (e.g. 
travel costs, visa), psychic cost of leaving the home country and family, adjustment costs in the 
host country or risks underlying migration decisions (Schwartz 1973, Carrington et al. 1996, 
Bauer et al. 2000, Gordon and Molho 1995, Drinkwater 2003, Langley 1974, Hart 1975). 
Over the past years difficulties in finding adequate data to study the characteristics of 
migrants prompted economists to make more use of intentions data and thereby study migration 
behavior indirectly—an approach that is also followed by in this study (Hughes and 
                                                 
2 Also see, Sjaastad (1992), Todaro (1969), Molho (1986), Borjas (1994), Chiswick (1999) or Bauer and 
Zimmerman (1998) for an overview of approaches.  
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McCormick 1985, Papapanagos and Sanfey 2001, Drinkwater 2003 Adams 1993, Bilsborrow et 
al. 1987). This allows looking at individual characteristics that are important to determine 
migration at a time when the migrant is still in the country of origin and consequently allows to 
look at migration pressures in more detail. The problem in these samples could be that they 
might suffer from selection because those who have already left the country are not captured in 
the surveys. However, host country data do not give a full picture of migration pressures either 
as it includes only those people who succeeded in migrating and who have been selected due to 
factors such as immigration policies and proximities between sending and receiving countries 
(Jasso et al. 2000). While the survey used in this study may indeed suffer from the first kind of 
selection, it is nevertheless possible to analyze both migration pressures and the role of 
immigration policies, and to disentangle ‘self-selection’ (in migration pressures) from ‘out-
selection’ (by immigration policies). The great detail of the variables available allows 
incorporating migration constraints despite using intentions-based data. 
Obviously, it is arguable whether intentions are an adequate predictor of actual 
migration behavior. Thus, it is fundamental to explore the link between intentions  and 
subsequent actions. The starting point for this analysis is the work on the ‘theory of reasoned 
action’ of Ajzen (1985, 1988). It does not differ essentially from economic theory but 
approaches the migration decision from the socio-psychological angle. Based on this theory the 
action (emigration) is taken after the consequences have been weighed against the present 
status—all based on individual conditions, perceptions and expectations. Manski (1990) and 
Burda et al. (1998) point out that although there is some informational content in intentions-
based survey questions, researchers should not expect too much from such data. Manski (1990) 
stresses that there is no reason that differences on the individual level between intentions and 
behavior should “average out” in the aggregate. Also, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), hint 
at the general problem of using subjective variables as a dependent variable in econometric 
modeling.  
However, many studies confirm that, ‘actions’ are very well predicted by intentions 
(Louviere et al. 2000, Böheim and Taylor 2002, Kule et al. 2002, Papapanagos and Sanfey 
2001, Sandu and De Jong 1996). And numerous studies have emphasized the applicability of 
the theory of intentions or reasoned action to the migration context. Although, based on internal  
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migration, where following the migrant is much more practical than in international migration, 
they find a close relation between intentions and actions. 
3
It should be kept in mind, however, that the costs of international migration are higher; 
migrants face more obstacles and practical issues might dominate individual characteristics 
(e.g. need more resources, different language, getting a visa and work permit etc.). It may also 
be possible that the time between forming intentions and the actual action or emigration is 
longer in international migration. This may lead to an increased tendency of the individual 
adjusting her intentions until it comes to international migration, though empirical evidence for 
this is scarce. Gardener et al. (1986) for example finds that legal obstacles had been the main 
reason for Philippines abandoning their plans to migrate. Moreover, van der Erf and Heering 
(2002) analyze survey data from Morocco asking whether the significance of the characteristics 
that are said to predict intentions hold when these intentions are refined including timing of 
migration and actual steps already taken towards migration. They find that individual 
characteristics under these circumstances increasingly become less important predictors.
  
4
Most studies of intentions in international migration start with individual human capital 
or socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, education, work experience, 
unemployment and language skills as essentially determining migration decisions (De Jong et 
al. 1996, Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Bilsborrow 1993, Mora and Taylor 2005, Boyd and 
Grieco 2004, Stark and Taylor 1991). It is beyond the scope of this review to report all results 
of studies that have been done, the following will consequently focus only on literature that will 
be particularly important for the approach in this work which is the selection of migrants in the 
migration process distinguishing between self- and out-selection.  
 
These concerns about the discrepancies between intentions and behavior will be picked up in 
this study and tested to the extent possible. Due to the detail in the data underlying this study, 
these problems can, in fact, be mitigated as will be explained further below.  
                                                 
3 E.g. Fuller et al. (1986), De Jong et al. (1996); Sandu and De Jong (1996); De Jong, 2000 for Thailand; Fawcett 
(1986); Hughes and McCormick (1985), Gordon and Molho (1995) for the UK; Lu (1999), Yang (2000), Zohry 
(2005) for Egypt, Burda (1993) and Burda et al. (1998) for Germany, Ahn et al. (1999) for Spain and Faini et al. 
(1997) for Italy, Knight and Song (2003) for China, Drinkwater (2003), Liebig and Souza-Poza (2004) for EEC 
and EU countries. 
4 However, their sample size becomes very small.  
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2.2  Selection of Migrants 
A recurring question when it comes to characteristics of migrants is whether migrants 
are positively or negatively selected, and, as indicated, this is very controversial. Borjas (1987) 
argues that a more unequal income distribution in the sending country leads to an adverse skill 
mix of migrants, thus, negative selection. This view is widely challenged; and Chiswick (1978, 
1999, 2000) in particular, points out that positive selection can be expected—a higher income 
inequality in the sending country would only attenuate positive self-selection (Chicquiar and 
Hanson 2002, Liebig and Souza-Poza 2004). For example, Mora and Taylor (2005), Taylor et 
al. (2003) and Adams (2005) all find that human capital variables have a significant positive 
impact on the decision to migrate. Finally, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Orrenious and 
Zavodny (2005) come up with general evidence for intermediate selection in Mexican 
migration to the US. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) also conclude, that migrants tend to 
positively self-select  when the costs of migrating are high, and vice versa. Overall, the 
underlying selection in the migration decision is ambiguous and likely different with respect to 
specific sending and receiving countries as well as to motives of migration. Also, findings vary 
according to whether host or origin data was used (Constant and Massey 2002, Burda et al. 
1998, Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Beenstock 1996, Jasso and Rosenzweig 1988).  
Asymmetric information may also affect the composition of migrants. In the absence of 
any signaling and screening mechanisms by the host country’s employers, asymmetric 
information would lead to adverse selection of migrants (Katz and Stark 1987). Thus, if there 
were a screening mechanism in place, such as private recruitment firms, the skill level of 
migrants would increase because the additional information would be reflected in wages (Chau 
and Stark 1999). The basic model of asymmetric information has another application to the 
context of migration. Most importantly, the migrant also lacks information about conditions in 
the destination country.5
                                                 
5 Also see Molho (1996).  
 As a result, the migration decision has to be based on expectations 
(under asymmetric information) that may lead to a number and composition of people willing 
to leave that does not correspond to the capacities of host countries to absorb these migrants.  
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High positive expectations may lead to large numbers of people emigrating regardless of their 
skills. A rather pessimistic perspective would dissuade highly skilled people to leave.6
It is obvious that expectations mainly impact on migration intentions and thus on 
migration pressures. In a study on internal migration in Thailand, De Jong (2000) incorporates 
expectations about gains when staying at home versus to leaving. He argues that these 
expectations are the main factor impacting (negatively) on migration intentions. He considers 
migration as a two-step procedure; first, the intentions are formed influenced by various 
individual characteristics; then actual migration behavior occurs which he tracks using internal 
migration data.  
 
2.3  Immigration Policies and Selection 
In the case of international migration the realization of intentions is subject to additional 
constraints. Immigration policies and the restrictions they impose impact on the migration 
process and may prevent many from realizing their intentions. It should be expected that 
countries such as Australia and North America with traditionally more selective immigration 
policies create a positive out-selection and that countries with no such  policies attract 
immigrants with lower average skill (educational and professional) levels.  
Recently, several European countries, including France, Ireland, Germany and the UK, 
have begun to increasingly promote selective migration policies.7
Based on modified version of the above-mentioned macro data, Grogger and Hanson 
(2008) explain positive selection of individuals into migration and positive sorting of migrants 
across destinations using a Roy (1951) model of income maximization. They find that the 
selectivity of migration by skill depends on the reward to skill in the source country while skill-
 On the macro level, numbers 
on immigrant stocks by education level in OECD countries show that the share of skilled 
immigrants in countries with selective migration policies is much higher than in the EU, which 
primarily has received unskilled migrants. For example the share of skilled immigrants in 2000 
was 42.5 percent for the US, 37.8 percent for Australia and 23.1 percent in the EU15 (Docquier 
and Marfouk 2006).  
                                                 
6 McKenzie et al. (2007) present an interesting empirical study on the role of expectations in the migration 
decision. 
7 See Constant and Zimmerman (2005) for a more detailed discussion.  
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related wage differences are the dominant factor in explaining why the some countries receive 
more skilled immigrants than other destinations. Further, they control for distance variables 
such as language, colonial ties and geographical distance and find significant impacts. For 
example English speaking countries seem to receive comparatively more skilled migrants. They 
also control for factors that are part of migration policies. For example they find that 
destinations with liberal refugee and asylum policies draw relatively low skilled immigrants. 
Unfortunately, their findings on the effect of immigration policies are limited due to lack of 
comparable data. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that they find positive sorting for countries 
with skill-related wage differences that are mostly also those who have adopted selective 
immigration policies. 
Belot and Hatton (2008) also find that the greater the return to skills in the destination 
as compared to the source country, the stronger will be the positive selection of immigrants by 
skill-level, but they also argue that other factors such as cultural differences, geographic 
distance, linguistic proximity and immigration policies play an important role. However, they 
are not able to measure the latter. Similarly Bruecker and Defoort (2007) find that a higher 
inequality in earnings in the host countries can increase the favorable selection bias, while the 
same holds true for the sending countries. Moreover, they control for the role of migration 
barriers using guest worker agreements and a free movement control and conclude that 
decreased migration barriers favor lower skilled migrants, which implies the opposite direction 
for migration policies that increase the barriers.  
The latter can also be seen in a setting of migration cost reduction, which leads to the 
impact of migrant networks or the prevalence of diasporas on migration flows and their skill 
composition. Migration networks may lower migration costs and benefit lower-income 
individuals disproportionately (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006, 2007, Munshi 2003, Orrenius 
and Zavodny 2005, Petersen et al. 2004). Similarly, the size of networks also affects the use of 
family reunification programs, which generally allow for lower skilled migration. When 
migration constraints are less restrictive, traditional push and pull factors in migration are more 
at work, which correspond to migration pressures as Mayda (2005) finds in her comprehensive 
analysis of migration determinants.  
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While most studies fail to explicitly  incorporate migration policies when analyzing 
selection, there is one study that focuses particularly on this issue. Aydemir (2003) analyzes the 
migration process using micro data of migrants going from the US to Canada where he matches 
data from both countries to include migrants and non-migrants in both countries. Using the Roy 
model as a starting point, he models two steps where he first captures the selection in the 
application for immigration to Canada and subsequently the selection out of the pool of 
applicants, thus those who have obtained a visa. He finds a negative selection in the first step 
and a positive selection in the second. He concludes that the selection most studies find is 
driven by the selection imposed by receiving countries policies. He also notes that receiving 
countries select from a pool of negatively selected migrants. The latter would imply that 
countries with no selective migration policies might in fact have negatively selected migrants. 
Overall, from the theory and literature reviewed, it can be summarized that economic 
motives and conditions, and how they are perceived, are the primary cause of migration 
intentions. Economic prospects are important in both initiating and perpetuating migration. 
Networks are crucial in determining migration flows and their destinations, and may help 
reducing costs and risks for migrants and their families. At the individual level the 
characteristics of migrants are important as are the individual perceptions, which, based on the 
available information level, lead to expectations that result in particular migration intentions. 
Critical is to what degree intentions actually predict behavior. This is where migration policies 
have their impact and select migrants out of the pool of people willing to migrate. Largely, it 
seems that the composition of migrants in many host countries shifts towards relatively better 
educated people compared to the composition of people in the respective home countries, 
confirming a positive selection of migrants. But the studies also point out that the finding is not 
clear-cut and there are often many “buts” and “ifs”.  
This study will contribute to this discussion by shedding more light onto migration 
pressures in sending countries and the role of migration constraints. It will follow the two-step 
approach of the previously mentioned study by Aydemir (2003) and distinguish between the 
willingness or intent to migrate and the realization of migration intentions. With the unique 
data that the study is based on, it is possible to disentangle self-selection from out-selection in 
these two steps and to incorporate the role that receiving countries play in the migration 
process. The study will also look at destination choices of migrants to find evidence of  
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selection patterns that have been prevalent in the past, that is in particular to test whether the 
EU is (still) receiving less skilled migrants than other destinations. Given that the EU has a 
large stock of low skilled immigrants this has implications for the effectiveness of its selective 
migration policies. An explanation is that the dominance of network effects and their tendency 
to reduce the skill composition in migration flows as well as the heavy use of the family 
reunification scheme may slow down the intended impact of such policies immensely. The next 
section will present the data that is used to analyze the above question and present the models 
used for the estimations. 
3  DATA, STYLIZED FACTS AND ECONOMETRIC 
APPROACH 
3.1  The Survey Countries 
Four EU neighboring countries are included in the survey underlying this study; these 
are Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia. Table 1 presents their primary destination regions on 
the macro level showing that the EU is the main destination for Albanians and Tunisians; 
Moldavians primarily go to Russia and Egyptians to the Gulf region. Another table presenting 
the top-10 receiving countries is included in the appendix (A1). Thus, the tables show that the 
migrants from the survey countries go to a variety of different countries and migration flows 
from the sample countries are not skewed towards one region or country. 
Table 1 Destination regions for immigrants from the survey countries 
Host region  Albania  Moldova  Egypt  Tunisia 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.5%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2% 
EU27+  83.0%  10.8%  9.1%  76.4% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  6.0%  78.1%  1.0%  2.3% 
Middle East and North Africa  1.4%  3.9%  72.4%  11.7% 
North America  5.6%  3.5%  7.4%  2.3% 
Southern Africa  1.4%  1.6%  6.4%  5.1% 
South Asia  1.2%  1.4%  1.4%  1.4% 
East Asia and Pacific  0.9%  0.5%  2.0%  0.5% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 




Turning to the each survey country in particular. The large majority of migrants from 
Moldova are young, married males who usually work in the Russian construction industry for a 
limited period. The proportion of women is higher within the migrant flows to Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Turkey, where they work primarily in domestic and care services. About 40 percent 
of Moldavians are seasonal migrants, many of them illegal. As in the rest of Moldova’s 
working population, most migrants have secondary education and 20-25 percent of them 
completed university. Permanent migrants tend to be better educated than temporary ones. 
Based on data  that is unfortunately only available for OECD countries (and not including 
Russia), 45.8 percent of Moldovan immigrants in OECD countries are skilled—they represent 
3.4 percent of the tertiary educated labor force in Moldova (Docquier and Marfouk 2006).
8
The tradition of emigration from Albania goes back 15 years to the break down of the 
Former Soviet Union; in 2000 8.4 percent of the Albanian labor force lived in OECD countries. 
Albanian migrants tend to be young, disproportionately male, better educated, and the primary 
destinations are Greece and Italy. 9 percent of the Albanian tertiary educated labor force lives 
in OECD countries and 18.4 percent of all Albanian emigrants are highly skilled. Migrant 
remittances represent an important source of foreign exchange for Albania. Also, it was found 
that migrants are generally well positioned to find a job or establish a business on their return to 
Albania (Castaldo et al. 2005, Kule et al. 2002, Docquier and Marfouk 2006, Papanagos and 
Sanfey 2001). 
 
Moldovan migrants remit home about 56 percent of their earnings. The share of migrants in the 
total active age population is estimated to be 18 percent (Okólski 2004, Goerlich and Trebesch 
2008, Ghenecea and Gudumac 2004, CBS AXA 2005). 
A study by Giubilaro (1997) found that Tunisia had a migrant potential of 19 percent of 
the working age population and predicted that given the labor market pressures, emigration 
would increase (predicted for the time 2005-2010). Recently, increasingly significant numbers 
of qualified workers have emigrated from Tunisia, not only towards Europe (and France in 
particular) but also towards the Gulf States and North America. This is likely due to the 
considerable improvement in the levels of education of the Tunisian population over the past 30 
years, and because of high levels of unemployment among higher education graduates. 
                                                 
8 The overal selection rate is likely to be lower as most Moldovans go to Russia  and they tend to be less skilled 
(Goerlich and Trebesch (2008)).  
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Unemployment among young graduates is a huge problem and rose from 10.2% in 2004 to 
14% in 2005. This rate is expected to increase further, in 2016 to 21.6% and in 2017 to 26.1% 
(European Training Foundation 2007, Docquier and Marfouk 2006, Giubilaro 1997). The share 
of tertiary educated Tunisians who reside in OECD countries is 12.5 percent and the selection 
rate (share of skilled emigrants to all emigrants) is 14.9 percent.  
Unemployment is also a crucial factor for migration from Egypt. Official estimates 
placed unemployment at about 9 percent in 2004, but independent estimates are closer to 20 
percent. Most migrants are males migrating to Arab Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Jordan, and Kuwait. Estimates of number of migrants to the Gulf countries range from 
1.5 to 1.9 million, of which 88 percent migrate to the aforementioned countries. Unfortunately 
estimates of the share of tertiary educated migrants to the Gulf countries do not exist, but the 
share of tertiary educated Egyptians heading to OECD countries was 4.6 percent in 2000. The 
selection rate of Egyptian emigrants to OECD countries is comparatively high with 58.9 
percent. Recently Egypt has also witnessed massive immigration flows from neighboring 
African countries due to conflict and political instability in the Sudan and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Zohry 2005, Docquier and Marfouk 2006, Adams 1993). 
3.2  The Data 
The following analysis is based on a survey of potential migrants, which was conducted 
by the European Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006.
9
                                                 
9 There was another survey undertaken simultaneously which targeted return migrants. Also, another country, the 
Ukraine, will be added soon. 
 The underlying questionnaire of the 
survey has five sections. The first section gathers general demographic information of the 
individuals interviewed. The second section concentrates on work related variables. The third 
identifies who principally intends to migrate abroad. Subsequently, section four extensively 
interviews those who want to move abroad and asks a variety of questions determining a) how 
likely it is that they really will migrate, b) where to and why they want to leave and c) how they 
envision their migration process. Section five returns to the full set of respondents and asks 
questions regarding the household members, dwellings and additional income sources. The 
survey resulted in a total sample size of 3,834 respondents, 998 from Albania, 1,009 from 
Moldova, 812 from Egypt and 1,015 from Tunisia.   
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Details about the survey design can be found in the appendix. What should be 
mentioned here are potential problems that arise from misrepresentation of the data of the 
respective national population, which may result in a bias of the estimates. This concerns 
primarily Egypt where some villages and governorates were over-sampled to increase coverage 
of potential migrants to Europe. In addition individuals outside the labor force who were not in 
full-time education were excluded. The latter added to the already existing problem of male 
overrepresentation.
10
3.3  Econometric Approach 
  Overall, comparison with other data from the countries  shows that 
national representation was not fully achieved (see appendix for more detail). This has to be 
kept in mind throughout the analysis. Also, it should be emphasized that this analysis is based 
on data from four particular countries and results may not necessarily apply to migrants from 
other countries. 
The study employs various econometric models; the three main models will be 
presented in the following. They all analyze the selection within migration pressures, the role of 
migration policies in out-selecting migrants from the source countries, and the destination 
choice. All models assume a logistic distribution of the error term and make use of maximum 
likelihood estimation. The latent variable underlying the observations of the dependent 
variables y is y*, with 
 
y*= βx +ε. This section will first explain the variables that y takes in 
the three mentioned models and then explain the covariates in  x β  which are roughly similar in 
all models. 
The general model will estimate the probabilities that y takes a certain value (m) 
conditional on the covariates x and can be expressed in terms of probabilities such as 
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10 Women are also underrepresented in Tunisia. In general, educated people tend to be overrepresented but there is 
no sign that this occured in a systematic way. The survey was unfortunately not corrected by weights to lessen 
these issues.   
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with F being the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the logistic function underlying the 
model. Further, y=m if 
 
τm−1 <= y*< τm for m=1…J possible outcomes of y, where the 
 
τ’s are 
the thresholds or cut-off points that are mainly relevant in the ordered logit model and equal to 
zero for the binary logit. 
The first model looks at factors that determine the probability of a person to have 
intentions to move to another country. Accordingly, the main purpose of this regression is to 
analyze the factors that determine the intent to migrate independent from any restrictions that 




Pr(y =1| x) = Pr(τ0 < y*<=τ1 | x)
= F(τ1 −βx)− F(τ0 −βx)
= F(τ1 −βx)
 with m=1 is used and therefore the model will estimate the probability of 
y=1 or the person indending to move: 
 
This model uses the full sample of potential migrants and non-migrants and has 1912 
cases that intend to move and 1922 that don’t.  
The second model is estimated for the subsample of people who intend to move, thus, 
all results are conditional on this selection. The purpose is to identify the role of immigration 
restrictions resulting from migration policies in selecting migrants out of the pool of people 
willing to move. The model is an ordered logit model with 3 different outcomes, thus m=3.
12
 
Pr(y =1| x) = Pr(τ0 < y*<=τ1 | x)
Pr(y = 2 | x) = Pr(τ1 < y*<=τ2 | x)
Pr(y = 3| x) = Pr(τ2 < y*<=τ3 | x)
 
The following probability expressions hold for each outcome: 
 
Accordingly, the dependent variable measures the propensity to migrate in three 
increasing categories and the individuals who intend to move are further categorized by 
increasing likelihood that they will actually do so. The three categories follow the answer to the 
question: does this person actually intend to realize her intentions? The answers are 
                                                 
11 For the purpose of identification 
 




12 The model satisfies the proportional odds or parallel lines assumption.  
 
17 
y=1=Maybe,  y=2=Likely and y=3=Certain. The calculation of the categories is not based on 
one question from the questionnaire only, but rather on a set of variables asked to determine 
how close potential migrants are to really migrating. For example, the questionnaire asks how 
likely it is that a person moves within the next 6 months or within the next two years. Further, 
individuals are asked about their ability to finance migration and about whether they know 
about, and already possess, certain prerequisites for migration such as passport, visa, health 
record, work contract or approval for study. The answers to this very rich set of questions allow 
a detailed classification that distinguishes between the degrees of likelihood of migration. Still, 
it should be kept in mind that this data is limited on a-priori intentions and that we do not 
observe who will actually migrate.  
The third model is a multinomial logit where the choice of destination is explained. 




Pr(y = m | x) = exp(βmx)/ exp(β jx)
j=1
M ∑
 The probabilities of the outcomes are defined by 
 
Pr(y=j) has to sum to 1 over all choices (∑ = = =
M
j j y
1 1 ) Pr( ) and only M-1 of the probabilities 
can be determined independently, which can be solved by setting  0 1 = β , resulting in 
 
Pr(y =1) =1/1+ exp(β jx)
j=2
M ∑




for each outcome. With M=3 outcomes like in this particular case, there are M-1=2 equations 
that are defined independently from each other. As the category of non-migrants forms a 
natural base category, both outcomes, EU and non-EU, will be compared to this base 
category.
14
                                                 
13 The sample size does not allow any further distinction.  
 The dependent variables of all models are summarized in Table A2 in the appendix. 
14 The discrete set of choices in the model satisfies the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives assumption 
(IIA), i.e., that the error term is extreme value distributed and not correlated across choices.   
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While the dependent variable to be explained and the sample choice vary across the 
models, the determinants are similar though not equal. For all models with the underlying latent 
variable 
 
y*= βx +ε the equation to be estimated is 
 
βx = β0 + β1D+ β2E + β3LM + β4I + β5M + β6C 
D represents a set of demographic variables such as age, sex, marital status, household (HH) 
size, number of children and relation to head of HH. These are the same across the models. E 
represents variables of education, which are of primary interest in this analysis. Included in E is 
a set of dummies with primary (and no education), secondary and post-secondary or tertiary 
education and language skills. The schooling level variable is the same across the models.
15 In 
the data, looking at all countries the share of higher skilled people is higher among the 
“migrants” than among the general population. Additionally E includes language skills.
16
LM represents a set of variables associated with labor market characteristics of the 
individuals and is the same across all models. It includes the labor market status, level of work 
performing and industry dummies. The descriptive data of the labor market status reveals that 
in total especially unemployed people intend to move, followed by casual workers and 
students. For people who intend to stay in their home country the number of professionals and 
those who work in middle and high management (high) is much higher. In general, most 
individuals work or have worked in the industry of public administration and utilities (not 
counting those who never worked or didn’t answer the question) followed by petty trade and 
agriculture. Nevertheless, among those who intend to move, construction seems to be the 
leading industry. 
 The 
language variable is ‘speaking an additional language to the mother tongue’ for models 1 and 3 
and. As more specific information is available for the subsample of migrants, the language 
variable in model 2 is ‘how well the person speaks the language of the intended destination 
country’. 
                                                 
15 The construction of this variable attempts to harmonize across education systems corresponding to information 
from the World Higher Education Database by the International Association of Universities (IAU) and the 
UNESCO (UNESCO, IAU WHED). 
16 Language skills are a very important factor for integration in the host country, see Chiswick and Miller (1995, 
2003).   
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Further, the models control for several income related variables (I). The survey gives 
information on several income sources, including yearly salary
17, income from other family 
members, rent, savings, pensions and social assistance, land, or remittances. Further, whether 
individuals consider their income as sufficient and finally how they compare to other 
households in the community. The remittance variable is also likely to capture migration 
network effects because those who receive remittances are more likely to migrate as they have 
links to the remittances sending country and are more exposed to the idea of migration.
18
Other migration relevant variables are included in the control of M in the equation. For 
the first model this only includes the variable of having a family member abroad (network 
effect) which proved as a very important determinant in many studies and is relevant for 10 
percent of the entire sample but almost 17 percent for those who have intentions to move; and 
whether someone is aware of a migration assisting program of private or governmental nature. 
The latter concerns 15 percent of the sample. As expected, this percentage is lower for those 
who intend to stay (7 percent) and higher for those who want to move (24 percent). It should be 
noted that the latter variable might be associated with endogeneity problems. Awareness of 
programs requires active involvement of the person, and as a result, there may be a tendency 
for people who intend to migrate to also be more aware of such programs. This technical 
problem could in principle be addressed by a two-step procedure using a suitable instrumental 
variable. A useful variable could be the distance of an individual’s residence to such program 
or another characteristic of how (easy) an individual can access information about the program. 
Unfortunately, such a variable is not found in the data and could not be constructed as 
geographical information on respondents is practically absent. In the second model this variable 
further distinguishes between those who know about a program and those who also want to 
participate. Endogeneity is less problematic due to the use of the subsample, the coefficient 
should clearly be positive. 
  
In  the third model the variable of having a relative abroad is modified to having a 
household member in either the EU or other locations, which is obviously an important control 
                                                 
17 In Euro and adjusted by 2006 average exchange rates. 
18 See Van Dalen et al. (2005b), Rapoport and Docquier (2005), Lucas and Stark (1985), Poirine (1997), VanWey 
(2004),  Stark (1999) for more details.  
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when it comes to destination choice. This variable tests whether networks direct migration 
flows to a certain destination, which is most likely the case. 
As mentioned before, the subsample used for the second model allows taking advantage 
of more specific migration information. Thus M includes more variables. The first is the source 
of  information about the destination country. The idea is that sources, which give better 
information, will allow the information recipient to have an advantage in realizing migration, 
e.g., overcome migration constraints. The data shows that people mainly acquire information 
via friends abroad (if  “other” is ignored). This is particularly prevalent in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Having been abroad, as a source of information, is comparatively higher in Albania and 
Moldova. Overall, formal institutions—i.e. schools, agencies, and other organizations—seem to 
have a minor role as an information resource. It is assumed that information from relatives, 
from having been abroad and from institutions offer the best or most accurate information. 
Further, M includes reasons for migrating (personal, improve living standard, improve 
work, other). In the descriptive data the primary reason why people intend to migrate seems to 
be either to improve work options or, more generally, living conditions. By country it can be 
seen though that this is particularly the case in Albania and Moldova, while in Tunisia and 
Egypt personal reasons become more relevant. Included is also whether the migration decision 
is influenced by others, which is the case for about one third of migrants.  
All models also control for country specific characteristics by including country 
dummies C. 
4  RESULTS  
Within the models presented above the analysis will primarily look at variables that are 
relevant in determining the selection of migrants. This does not only refer to educational 
variables but also variables with respect to labor market characteristics, income and network 
variables. Also it will be tested whether country specific characteristics are of importance when 
it comes to the selection of migrants. The analysis will start analyzing the first model and the 
intent to move. Then it will move on to presenting the results of the second model, which will 
be complemented by several additional estimations to check for the robustness of the results. 
Finally, results from the destination choice model will be presented which will emphasize the 
status of the EU in the selection discussion and her desire to increasingly select immigrants.  
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4.1  The Intent to Move 
The results from the first model are presented in Table 2, which shows odds ratios and 
marginal effects for the full set of variables included in the model. This model explains the 
characteristics that individuals who intend to migrate abroad have compared to those who have 
no such intentions. Regarding the education variable, the probability of migration intentions 
significantly increases by about 6.7 percentage points for tertiary compared to primary 
educated people. The effect of secondary education is small and insignificant. This is in line 
with other studies,
19
Language skills are positively associated with the intent to migrate.
 but already at this point, it should be noted that there is much less selection 
in migration pressures when country differences are taken into account (see further below). It 
appears that education is a variable that is significantly different across countries. 
20
The labor market status of a person is categorized in six different categories: being an 
employee (base outcome), employer, casual worker, student, unemployed and unknown or 
never worked.
 While speaking two 
or more foreign languages proved insignificant and is excluded from the analysis, speaking 
more than one language, is significant with a marginal effect of 9 percentage points. 
21 Only unemployment seems to have an impact. Compared to employees, the 
odds of moving increase by 84 percent (the marginal effect is 15 percentage points). This is in 
line with problems identified in the labor markets of the respective countries. Many 
unemployed people—young ones in particular—see migration as a way (back) into 
employment (Castaldo et al. 2005, Zohry 2005).
22
                                                 
19 See Van Dalen et al. (2005a), Sadiqi (2007), Goerlich and Trebesch (2008), Hay (1980) and others. 
 An interaction of education and labor market 
status reveals, in fact, that particularly higher educated people who are unemployed or have not 
yet worked, are more likely to be among the migrants. The result of this interaction is presented 
in Figure 1 showing the predicted probabilities of intending to move by education. This also 
adds to the notion that the education effect may not be clear-cut. 
20 Also see Mora and Taylor (2005). 
21 It should be noted that the latter is just a control for those for whom no answer or other information was given 
and has no value for interpretation. However, keeping the observations allows maintaining the sample size. 
22 Running the model including an interaction of age and labor market status however, did not confirm this.  
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Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities of the Intent to Move: Effect of Education by Employment 
  
The work level of people is of particular interest with respect to selection. People 
working in a higher work level seem to be less likely to move, which is intuitive as they are 
well established in their home country and are not as much subject to emigration pressures. 
This finding tends to be ignored by policy makers in receiving countries who develop visa 
policies such as the blue card, which target exactly this group. Evidence in the past has shown 
that while these visas sound appealing (e.g. the German “Green Card”) they do not necessarily 
attract many migrants.
23 The estimates from this model confirm such evidence.
24
There are a variety of variables with respect to a person’s financial resources. The 
income variables include salary and various income sources such as rent, savings or other 
family members The overall tendency is that these resources are inversely related to migration 
intentions as previous research found, but the effect is not very large.
 
25
                                                 
23 See Focus-Migration (2005) for the German Green Card. 
 The big exception is 
income from remittances, which has a large positive impact. Remittances also capture network 
24 Note that even though one might suspect a collinearity problem in the estimates due to correlation between 
education and work skill level, this is not a problem in this model. 
25 Also see Stark (1991), Goerlich and Trebesch (2008), van Dalen et al. (2005b), Adams (1993), McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2004), (Skeldon 1997), Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler (2005).  
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effects, which have a positive impacts in most studies as they do in this data. This finding is 
reinforced by the strong effect of the variable “presence of a family member abroad”, which 
increases the odds of migration by 24 percent.  
Table 2 Dependent: Intent to Migrate 
Dependent: Intent to Migrate (Logistic Regression) 
       Odds Ratio   Marginal Effect  
Demographics  Age  0.988  -0.003 
         (0.010)  (0.003) 
  Female  0.495***  -0.173*** 
    (0.046)  (0.022) 
  Married     0.988  -0.003 
         (0.150)  (0.038) 
 
Number of 
children  0.820***  -0.050*** 
         (0.053)  (0.016) 
Relation to household 
head (HHH) 
Child, grandchild 
or other of HHH  1.181  0.042 
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)  (0.158)  (0.033) 
  HH Size  1.040  0.010 
         (0.028)  (0.007) 
  Family abroad  1.242  0.054 
         (0.172)  (0.034) 
Education  Secondary  0.988  -0.003 
(primary=base outcome)  (0.104)  (0.026) 
 
Tertiary/Post-
secondary  1.308*  0.067* 
    (0.180)  (0.034) 
  Language  1.438***  0.090*** 
    (0.150)  (0.026) 
Labor market status  Employer  1.007  0.002 
(employed=base outcome)  (0.131)  (0.033) 
  Casual worker  1.171  0.039 
    (0.162)  (0.035) 
  Student  0.865  -0.036 
         (0.156)  (0.045) 
  Unemployed  1.840***  0.150*** 
         (0.272)  (0.035) 
 
Never 
worked/Unknown  1.142  0.033 
         (0.255)  (0.056) 
Industry of work  Petty Trade  0.958  -0.011 
(public admin. and 
utilities=base outcome)         (0.190)  (0.049) 
 
Manufacturing and 
mining  1.350  0.075 
         (0.268)  (0.049) 
  Construction  1.896***  0.157*** 
         (0.374)  (0.046)  
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Dependent: Intent to Migrate (Logistic Regression) 
       Odds Ratio   Marginal Effect  
  Commerce  1.146  0.034 
         (0.219)  (0.048) 
  Agriculture  1.139  0.033 




services  1.696***  0.130*** 
         (0.333)  (0.047) 
 
Transport and 
repair  1.700***  0.131*** 
         (0.326)  (0.046) 
  ICT and other  1.448*  0.092* 
         (0.278)  (0.047) 
 
Never 
worked/Unknown  0.866  -0.036 
         (0.282)  (0.081) 
Skill level of work  Medium  1.660***  0.126*** 
(high=base outcome)         (0.228)  (0.034) 
  Low  1.740***  0.137*** 
         (0.265)  (0.037) 
 
Never 
worked/Unknown  1.450  0.093 
           (0.436)           (0.074)   
  Salary           0.997***          -0.001*** 
           (0.000)           (0.000)   
Income satisfaction  Sufficient              1.096             0.023   
("ok"=base outcome)         (0.130)           (0.030)   
  Not sufficient           0.706***          -0.087*** 
                (0.070)           (0.025)   
Income compared to 
others in the community  Better           1.165             0.038   
("same"=base outcome)         (0.151)           (0.032)   
  Worse               1.076             0.018   
                (0.110)           (0.026)   
Income from  Remittances           2.254***           0.198*** 
           (0.283)           (0.029)   
 
Other family 
member           0.861*           -0.038*  
           (0.076)           (0.022)   
  Agriculture           0.839            -0.044   
           (0.104)           (0.031)   
  Savings           1.028             0.007   
                (0.128)           (0.031)   
  Rent           0.635***          -0.112*** 
                (0.089)           (0.033)   
 
Social assistance 
and pension           1.102             0.024   
                (0.104)           (0.024)   
  Land owner           1.002             0.000    
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Dependent: Intent to Migrate (Logistic Regression) 
       Odds Ratio   Marginal Effect  
                (0.119)           (0.030)   
Awareness of programs assisting migration           4.599***           0.345*** 
           (0.568)           (0.023)   
Country dummies  Egypt           0.897            -0.027   
(Albania=base outcome)         (0.120)           (0.033)   
  Moldova           0.528***          -0.157*** 
                (0.078)           (0.035)   
  Tunisia           1.469***           0.096*** 
             (0.208)           (0.035)   
Number of observations  3618  3618 
Log-likelihood    -2078.02  -2078.02 
Chi-square     610.774  610.774 
Pseudo R-Square    0.171  0.171 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
 
Overall, a first result is that better educated people who are less integrated in the home 
labor market (unemployed or working in lower skilled jobs) tend to migrate. However, testing 
the robustness of the result by estimating the model for each country separately, shows that 
education variable is different across countries. In fact, the result is driven by the sample from 
Egypt. Excluding Egypt from the sample results in an insignificant coefficient for tertiary (and 
secondary) education. The previously found selection in the model explaining the intent to 
move is consequently a special case of Egypt.
26 This finding requires introducing interactions 
to further investigate the effect of education. This allows specifically looking at the problem 
that education may be driven by the sample from Egypt, and simultaneously keeping the larger 
sample size.
27
                                                 
26 On the one hand the explanation may lie within the survey design, i.e. the special problems that interviewers 
faced in Egypt, which do not rule out that highly skilled people intending to migrate were systematically over-
represented. However, according to other empirical evidence Egypt also has a high selection rate (share of skilled 
emigrants among all emigrants) of almost 60 percent in OECD destinations (Docquier and Marfouk (2006)). 
 The results are presented in Table 3. 




Table 3 Dependent: Intent to Migrate - Interactions between education and countries 
Dependent: Intent to Migrate (Logistic Regression) 
      Odds Ratio  
Education  Secondary  0.774 
(primary=base outcome)  (0.141) 
  Tertiary/Post-secondary  1.258 
         (0.341) 
Country dummies  Egypt  0.424*** 
(Albania=base outcome)  (0.109) 
  Moldova  0.452*** 
         (0.101) 
  Tunisia  1.474* 
         (0.335) 
Interactions  Secondary*Egypt  2.039** 
         (0.580) 
  Secondary*Moldova  1.506 
         (0.384) 
  Secondary*Tunisia  1.228 
         (0.324) 
  Tertiary/Post-secondary*Egypt  3.232*** 
         (1.142) 
  Secondary/Post-secondary*Moldova  0.707 
         (0.259) 
  Secondary/Post-secondary*Tunisia  0.751 
          (0.244) 
Number of observations  3618 
Log-likelihood    -2061.33 
Chi-square     629.193 
Pseudo R-Square    0.178 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
 
The results show that the effect of tertiary compared to primary education on the 
probability to move is now insignificant. As Albania is the base outcome for the countries, this 
effect concerns tertiary educated Albanians. The interaction effects of Egypt with tertiary and 
secondary education are positive and significant. All other interaction effects are insignificant. 
All country dummies remain significant indicating that there are other country specific 
characteristics that they capture. What all this means for the predicted probability to move is 
visualized in Figure 2, which shows the effects of education by country.   
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Figure 2 Predicted Probabilities of Intent to Move: Effect of Education by Country 
 
The results lead to the conclusion that the positive impact in the sample is indeed driven 
by Egypt and for the three other countries there is no selection when it comes to education of 
people intending to move. Thus, it is not the educated in particular who create migration 
pressures and want to move abroad. However, as the brain drain literature well documents, it is 
often the educated that arrive in the host country, which leads to the second step in the 
migration decision where not only intentions but also constraints such as those imposed by 
immigration policies are of concern. This step will be addressed in the next section. 
4.2  Realizing Migration under Immigration Policies 
The model describing this second step in the migration process is, as mentioned before, 
an ordered logit model that only includes the subsample of those who intend to migrate. The 
model takes migration intentions further, and identifies characteristics associated with people 
who are extremely likely to migrate in the near future (outcome “certain”), likely to do so 
(outcome “likely”) or uncertain in the realization of their migration intentions (outcome 
“maybe”). Again, the dependent variable is calculated based on answers from questions 
regarding (i) personal evaluation of the likelihood to migrate and (ii) requirements that have  
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already been fulfilled to actually migrate (e.g. having a visa). Also, it should be noted that the 
model is based on the “selected” subsample and thus it should be emphasized that the model 
compares within the group of intending migrants and does not include non-migrants. The 
results are reported in Table 4. The first column shows odds ratios and subsequent columns 
marginal effects for each outcome. The results are as follows: 
Tertiary or post-secondary education has a positive impact on the propensity to migrate 
compared to primary education; the proportional odds increase by 85 percent. Thus, better-
educated people who intend to migrate are more likely to actually do so. With respect to 
language skills, speaking the language of the country where the individual would move to 
fluently compared to ok does not increase the propensity to migrate; but having very poor 
language skills clearly seems to be an obstacle to moving. The proportional odds decrease by 
33 percent compared to the reference group. It should also be emphasized that poor language 
skills are also problematic for transferring ones skills to the new host country. 
The variable on labor market status brings new insights. The skill level of work has no 
significant effect and is in fact excluded from the model.
28
Salary seems to matter much less. Subjective and relative income measures, or income 
satisfaction measures, however, seem to make more of a difference. Considering one’s income 
as sufficient is positively associated with the intensity of migration intentions. This may reflect 
the ability to better finance migration and make use of services facilitating migration. It should 
be stressed that this does not contradict the previous finding (and that of other studies) of 
 Unemployment is now insignificant. 
Unemployment may signal a lower ability to sustain in the workforce and therefore this group 
does have increased pressure to migrate. However, it could be speculated that unemployed 
people may face more obstacles when realizing migration intentions than working people  and 
therefore they are not more likely to realize their intentions. The effect of being a student 
decreases the propensity to migrate significantly. The outcome for students could result from 
the possibility that students are usually still outside the labor market and at the beginning of 
their career. As a result, they may be less certain about their career path and consequently less 
sure about emigration.  
                                                 
28 The reason for this is that the fourth category of those who didn’t answer ‚don’t work or never worked’ is almost 
identical to the last category of the industry dummies (controlling for a similar group) and as it does not add to the 
explanatory power for the model while the industry dummies have, the variable can be dropped.  
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increased migration intentions among the less wealthy because the model addresses only those 
who intend to migrate.
29
Income from remittances is again positive and significant, indicating that network effects 
are also important in the step of realizing migration intentions. It could be, for example, that the 
person sending remittances is a family member and facilitates migration through a family 
reunification scheme. 
 The effect for people who feel relatively deprived compared to their 
neighbors is insignificant.  
The reason why people migrate is interesting to look at, though only indirectly linked to 
the selection of migrants. Personal reasons seem to be of primary importance to realize 
migration intentions, the dummies comparing to this base outcome all have a negative 
coefficient (though not always significant). Personal reasons include people saying they 
generally did not see a future in their home country, they were following their family, or left to 
get married. Hence, this dummy may also capture some network effects and the finding could 
correspond to migration through channels of family reunification, a channel that has generally 
allowed migration of more low skilled people.
30
Another migration relevant variable is the source from which the individuals gather their 
information. Better information may make it easier to tackle migration requirements imposed 
by the host country. The variable of information source in the model has seven categories: 
information from the news media, institutions, friends abroad, immediate family abroad, having 
been abroad, and other. It is assumed that the information from institutions, family abroad and 
having been abroad results in “better” and more credible information.
  
31
                                                 
29 See Adams (1993), Burda et al. (1998) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2004). 
 Indeed, compared to 
news, which is the base outcome, these three categories have a significant positive effect. 
Having been abroad has the strongest impact and increases the odds by 124 percent. It should 
be noted that the share of return migrants in this group is likely to be very small due to the 
30 Note that the significance of personal reasons does imply that economic reasons (better work and eventually 
better living) are not major reasons for people to migrate but they seem to be less relevant for realizing migration 
intentions and are possibly more important for forming migration intentions. 
31 Also see McKenzie et al. (2007).  
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survey design; so these people are mostly visitors.
32 This variable also captures network effects 
as it incorporates the category of having a relative abroad.
33
Table 4 Dependent: Propensity to Migrate 
 
Dependent: Propensity to Migrate             
Ordered logit model      Certain      Likely       Maybe   
      Odds ratio    Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
Demographics  Age       0.979         -0.004         -0.001          0.005    
                 (0.013)        (0.002)        (0.001)        (0.003)    
  Female       0.777*        -0.041*        -0.016          0.057*   
       (0.106)        (0.021)        (0.010)        (0.031)    
  Married              1.463**        0.067*         0.016**       -0.083**  
                 (0.283)        (0.035)        (0.006)        (0.041)    
 
Number of 
children        0.954         -0.008         -0.003          0.011    
                 (0.095)        (0.017)        (0.005)        (0.022)    
Relation to household 
head (HHH) 
Child, grandchild 
or other of HHH       0.968         -0.005         -0.002          0.007    
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)     (0.158)        (0.028)        (0.009)        (0.036)    
  HH Size       0.949*        -0.009*        -0.003*         0.012*   
       (0.030)        (0.005)        (0.002)        (0.007)    
Ability to speak 
language of potential 
destination country  Very well       0.936         -0.011         -0.004          0.015    
("ok"=base outcome)     (0.111)        (0.020)        (0.007)        (0.027)    
  Hardly       0.664***      -0.065***      -0.029**        0.094*** 
       (0.086)        (0.019)        (0.012)        (0.031)    
Education  Secondary       1.046          0.008          0.002         -0.010    
(primary=base outcome)     (0.133)        (0.021)        (0.007)        (0.028)    
 
Tertiary/Post-
secondary       1.853***       0.112***       0.018***      -0.130*** 
                 (0.302)        (0.032)        (0.005)        (0.032)    
Labor market status  Employer       0.928         -0.012         -0.004          0.017    
(employed=base outcome)     (0.147)        (0.026)        (0.010)        (0.036)    
  Casual worker       1.206          0.033          0.008         -0.041    
       (0.201)        (0.030)        (0.005)        (0.035)    
  Student       0.592***      -0.079***      -0.043**        0.123*** 
                 (0.113)        (0.026)        (0.021)        (0.046)    
  Unemployed       0.996         -0.001         -0.000          0.001    
                 (0.148)        (0.025)        (0.008)        (0.033)    
                                                 
32 In fact, respondents were asked whether they had been abroad for more than six months and had returned more 
than 3 months and less than 10 years ago; if this was the case they were asked the „partner“ survey on return 
migrants which is not touched upon in this paper. 
33 It should be noted that literature also shows that network effects lower the migration cost and make the 
migration option more feasible to poorer and less educated people. Consequently they may disproportionally 
benefit lower skilled migrants and reduce the selection. Unfortunately this hypothesis could not be tested with this 
data due to sample size issues. (see Massey et al., (1994, 1998); Munshi (2003); Winters et al. (2001), Bauer et al. 




Dependent: Propensity to Migrate             
Ordered logit model      Certain      Likely       Maybe   
      Odds ratio    Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
 
Never 
worked/Unknown       2.289***       0.167***      -0.010         -0.157*** 
       (0.574)        (0.058)        (0.020)        (0.039)    
Industry of work 
Petty Trade, 
Commerce, hotel, 
restaurant       1.241          0.037          0.010         -0.047    








agriculture       1.572**        0.083*         0.011***      -0.095**  




repair       1.359          0.054          0.012**       -0.066    
                 (0.277)        (0.038)        (0.005)        (0.042)    
 
Other or never 
worked/Unknown       1.076          0.012          0.004         -0.016    
       (0.221)        (0.035)        (0.010)        (0.045)    
  Salary       1.001***       0.000***       0.000**       -0.000*** 
       (0.001)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)    
Income satisfaction  Not sufficient       0.988         -0.002         -0.001          0.003    
("ok"=base outcome)     (0.146)        (0.025)        (0.008)        (0.033)    
  Sufficient            1.537***       0.073***       0.022***      -0.095*** 
       (0.182)        (0.020)        (0.007)        (0.026)    
Income compared to 
others in the 
community  Worse       1.259          0.041          0.009**       -0.050    
("same"=base outcome)     (0.188)        (0.027)        (0.004)        (0.031)    
  Better       1.029          0.005          0.002         -0.006    
                 (0.128)        (0.021)        (0.006)        (0.028)    
Income from  Remittances       1.334**        0.051**        0.012***      -0.062**  
       (0.170)        (0.023)        (0.004)        (0.027)    
 
Other family 
member       0.840*        -0.030*        -0.009*         0.039*   
       (0.087)        (0.018)        (0.005)        (0.023)    
  Agriculture       1.007          0.001          0.000         -0.002    
       (0.158)        (0.027)        (0.009)        (0.035)    
  Savings       1.277          0.043          0.009**       -0.053    
                 (0.208)        (0.030)        (0.004)        (0.034)    
  Rent       1.094          0.015          0.004         -0.020    
                 (0.206)        (0.033)        (0.008)        (0.041)    
 
Social assistance 
and pension       0.950         -0.009         -0.003          0.012    
                 (0.112)        (0.019)        (0.007)        (0.026)    
  Land owner       1.101          0.016          0.005         -0.021    
                 (0.168)        (0.026)        (0.008)        (0.034)    
Reason for leaving  Improve living       0.752**       -0.047**       -0.018*         0.064**   
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Dependent: Propensity to Migrate             
Ordered logit model      Certain      Likely       Maybe   
      Odds ratio    Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
conditions 
(personal=base outcome)     (0.098)        (0.021)        (0.009)        (0.030)    
  Better work       0.802         -0.036*        -0.014          0.050    
       (0.109)        (0.022)        (0.009)        (0.031)    
  Other       0.975         -0.004         -0.001          0.006    





others       0.795**       -0.038**       -0.014*         0.052**  
                 (0.091)        (0.018)        (0.008)        (0.026)    
Information about 
destination country 
via:  Institution       1.784*         0.112          0.003         -0.116**  
(news=base outcome)     (0.593)        (0.072)        (0.015)        (0.058)    
  Family at home       0.811         -0.033         -0.015          0.048    
       (0.201)        (0.037)        (0.021)        (0.058)    
  Friends abroad       1.117          0.019          0.006         -0.024    
       (0.195)        (0.030)        (0.008)        (0.038)    
  Been abroad       2.245***       0.161***      -0.004         -0.157*** 
                 (0.541)        (0.055)        (0.017)        (0.039)    
  Other       0.523***      -0.104***      -0.043***       0.147*** 
                 (0.089)        (0.026)        (0.014)        (0.039)    
  Family abroad       1.519*         0.077          0.010**       -0.087*   
                 (0.356)        (0.047)        (0.004)        (0.045)    
Migration assisting 
programs  Would participate       1.622***       0.089***       0.012***      -0.101*** 
       (0.237)        (0.029)        (0.004)        (0.028)    
 
Is aware but no 
participation 
intend       1.151          0.024          0.006         -0.031    
       (0.189)        (0.029)        (0.006)        (0.035)    
Country dummies  Egypt       1.674***       0.094***       0.015***      -0.109*** 
(Albania=base outcome)     (0.304)        (0.036)        (0.004)        (0.036)    
  Moldova       1.807***       0.109***       0.015***      -0.124*** 
                 (0.326)        (0.036)        (0.005)        (0.035)    
  Tunisia       0.634**       -0.073***      -0.031**        0.104**  
       (0.117)        (0.028)        (0.015)        (0.043)    
  Cut1       0.347**        
       (0.177)          
  Cut2       2.533*         
         (1.292)             
Number of observations  1762  1762  1762  1762 
Log-likelihood        -1726.1  -1726.1  -1726.1  -1726.1 
Chi-square         317.985  317.985  317.985  317.985 
Pseudo R-Square     0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093 




The country dummies are significant in all models, which implies that there are country 
specific characteristics that play a role in the likelihood of migration. Again, it could be that the 
result of a present selection could be driven by Egypt as it was in the first model. However, 
interactions between country and education variables do not confirm this and the results are 
robust towards excluding Egypt from the sample. Thus, it can be concluded with relative 
confidence that the selection of migrants does not happen in the willingness to migrate, but in 
the willingness and ability to realize ones intentions. It is in this second step that selective 
immigration policies are of importance as they indeed seem to affect the probability of 
migration. 
Now, it is possible to argue that the way the dependent variable in the ordered logit 
model has been computed is arbitrary and results may not be true. This problem can be 
addressed by estimating models for the variables that are included in the calculation of the 
categories in the dependent variable. This is not possible for all of the variables due to sample 
size issues but it is for most of them. The results are presented in the appendix in Table A3. 
In the first of such models the dependent is the number of documents that a person has and that 
are necessary to emigrate. The variable can take the values 1 to 5 and takes the features of 
count data. The model is thus estimated using a poisson regression (column 1) and, despite its 
small data range, also estimated using OLS regression (column 2). The results confirm the 
positive selection of migrants and are robust to excluding Egypt. 
Further, the model is estimated applying a number of logit models measuring the 
probability of having a certain document: more than one document (column 3); more than two 
documents (column 4); a passport (column 5); a health record (column 6). Finally, a logit on 
whether migration can be financed or not is estimated (column 7). Except for the last model, all 
the models confirm the positive selection of the second model (also when excluding Egypt). 
Having estimated the model with respect to migration requirements, it is also necessary 
to estimate a model on the variable that lets the respondents evaluate their likelihood of 
migration within the next 6 months because it is also part of the calculation of the dependent in  
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the model of the previous section.
34
More generally, it should be noted that all models above do not control for destination 
specific characteristics or “pull” factors such as for example return to skills in the destinations. 
While these are certainly important determinants for the selection of migrants they are not 
subject in this analysis and cannot be captured with this data. 
  However, the results should confirm the outcomes from 
the first model as it captures the willingness to move rather than migration policies. The results 
are presented in the appendix Table A4. The model is estimated as an ordered logit with 5 
categories ranging from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’ in the dependent variable (see column 
1). As not all variables satisfy the parallel lines assumption, the same model is also estimated as 
a general ordered logit model allowing multiple equations (column 2 – 5). It turns out that 
education is insignificant and the models do not show any selection. 
Summing up the results, the additional regressions confirm that migration policies seem 
to induce a positive out-selection of migrants from a pool of people that is willing to migrate 
and that is not selected. The question is subsequently what this implies for the EU of which 
many countries have introduced selective immigration policies, or are about to do so.  
4.3  Destination Choice and Selection 
The following analysis will study destination choice of potential migrants on the 
individual level. It will distinguish between the EU as one destination and non-EU as a second 
destination, which includes several Gulf countries, Russia, North America, Australia and 
Turkey.
35
The results from estimating the multinomial model of destination choice are presented in 
Table 5. Estimation results are shown as relative risk ratios (RRR) and marginal effects. 
Generally, the relative risk ratio states that for a unit change in the predictor variable, the 
relative risk ratio of outcome m relative to the reference group is expected to change by a factor 
of the respective parameter estimate, given that all other variables in the model are held 
constant (at the mean). Thus, they are somehow similar to odds ratios and an a more intuitive 
way to present results from multinomial logit models than the bare coefficients. Consequently, 
 The analysis will primarily focus on the question whether the level of education is 
indeed different for migrants heading to the EU than for those heading to non-EU destinations.  
                                                 
34 There is also a similar variable taking the next 2 years as a time frame. 
35 The destinations had to be combined due to sample size issues.  
 
35 
for this specific model, EU and “other” are both compared to the reference group of non-
migrants and special attention should be given to variables where these ratios are different for 
both choices (each compared to the reference group). 
The selection in terms of the education level of migrants who choose non-EU 
destinations, is much stronger compared to the EU. Tertiary education versus primary 
education has a much higher relative risk ratio for non-EU than the EU outcome, which is 
insignificant. This translates into an increase in the odds of choosing non-EU over EU of 143 
percent when changing from primary to tertiary education. This does not mean that there are no 
highly skilled people deciding for the EU but it suggests that migrants to the EU are not 
positively selected and rather exhibit similar levels of education to their home country. Figure 3 
illustrates the effect of education by presenting the predicted probabilities for each destination. 


















Destinations within the EU
  
With respect to the labor market status, unemployment is a significant push factor for 
migration. Still, the relative risk ratio for choosing one of the destination alternatives versus the 
other when being unemployed compared to employed is roughly the same. This also applies to  
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the negative and significant effect of a higher work level (managerial or professional) versus 
low skilled, though the effect is a bit smaller for the non-EU destination. 
Regarding salary and other income sources the two choices compare pretty similar to 
the non-migrant group. This also extends to income from remittances, which is also a strong 
indicator for existing migration networks. The more important network variable is the location 
of a HH member living abroad—in the non-EU region or in the EU. The coefficients show 
exactly the expected signs and are highly significant. For the non-EU outcome the relative risk 
ratio for a HH member in the EU is 0.44 and in the non-EU region 1.66. For the EU outcome it 
is the other way with relative risk ratios of 1.87 for a HH member in the EU, and 0.49 for a 
member in non-EU  countries. Consequently, existing networks or links between people in 
sending and receiving countries greatly impact on the destination choice. 
To sum up the results, it can be said that higher education is especially important for 
non-EU destination countries. The latter result is to some extent driven by migrants going to 
North America and Australia which have the strongest selective migration policies.
36
The above results also show significant country dummies and make again a strong case 
to look at the impact of education by including potential differences across countries, as this 
has been important in the first model. Hence, the next model includes interaction effects of the 
country and education variables. The results are presented Figure 4, which shows how the 
predicted probabilities of both outcomes vary by education and country. 
 
                                                 
36 This result was indicated by another model where “other” was further split up into North America and “other”. It 
is not presented here as it did not satisfy all assumptions (IIA) and the sample size of the North America choice 
was critical.   
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Destinations within the EU
 
The figure shows that except for Moldova the predicted probabilities of outcome non-
EU strongly increase with increasing education. The curves are rather flat for the EU outcome, 
or even decrease in education (Tunisia and Albania). Thus, the interaction model confirms the 
result of selection among people heading towards non-EU destinations and no selection of 
those heading to the EU.
37
                                                 
37 Obviously, also excluding Egypt does not change the results. 
 The notion from macro data on immigration stocks—unfortunately 
only available for OECD countries—that the EU has been receiving a greater proportion of low 
skilled immigrants than other destinations is consequently confirmed and selective migration 




Table 5 Dependent : Destination Choice: EU versus Non-EU 
Dependent : Destination Choice: EU versus Non-EU 
Multinomial Logit Model       Non-EU           EU    EU  Non-EU  Non-Migrant 
      RRR  RRR  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
Demographics  Age            0.991               0.989         -0.002         -0.001          0.003    
                      (0.014)             (0.011)        (0.002)        (0.002)        (0.002)    
  Female 
          
0.422*** 
          
0.492***      -0.104***      -0.079***       0.184*** 
            (0.052)             (0.053)        (0.019)        (0.014)        (0.021)    
  Married                  1.069               0.995         -0.004          0.009         -0.005    
                      (0.207)             (0.167)        (0.032)        (0.025)        (0.036)    
 
Number of 
children            0.919    
          
0.752***      -0.054***       0.002          0.053*** 






other of HHH            1.189               1.211          0.031          0.014         -0.046    
(HHH and spouse=base outcome)          (0.206)             (0.180)        (0.028)        (0.021)        (0.032)    
  HH Size            1.015    
          
1.070**        0.013**       -0.001         -0.012*   
            (0.038)             (0.032)        (0.006)        (0.005)        (0.007)    
Family living 
abroad  In EU 
          
0.436*** 
          
1.868***       0.174***      -0.106***      -0.068*   
(no family abroad= base 
outcome)          (0.130)             (0.319)        (0.040)        (0.019)        (0.041)    
  In other 
          
1.660**  
          
0.491**       -0.142***       0.115***       0.027    





          
1.532*** 
          
1.404***       0.050**        0.040**       -0.090*** 
                      (0.216)             (0.165)        (0.022)        (0.016)        (0.024)    
Education  Primary            1.199               0.991         -0.010          0.025         -0.015    




          
2.753***            1.130         -0.031          0.152***      -0.121*** 
                      (0.488)             (0.172)        (0.028)        (0.030)        (0.033)    
Labor market 
status  Employer            0.934               0.882         -0.022         -0.004          0.026    
(employed=base outcome)          (0.161)             (0.123)        (0.027)        (0.022)        (0.029)    
  Casual worker            1.199               1.180          0.026          0.017         -0.043    
            (0.212)             (0.181)        (0.030)        (0.023)        (0.034)    
  Student            1.121    
          
0.606***      -0.099***       0.038          0.061    
                      (0.227)             (0.114)        (0.030)        (0.029)        (0.038)    
  Unemployed 
          
1.505**  
          
1.530***       0.069**        0.035         -0.104*** 
                      (0.268)             (0.233)        (0.032)        (0.025)        (0.033)    
 
Never 
worked/Unkno           0.899               0.862         -0.025         -0.008          0.033     
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Dependent : Destination Choice: EU versus Non-EU 
Multinomial Logit Model       Non-EU           EU    EU  Non-EU  Non-Migrant 
      RRR  RRR  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
wn 





hotel, restaurant            0.927    
          











agriculture            1.116    
          
1.739***       0.116**       -0.014         -0.102**  




repair            1.286    
          
2.615***       0.203***      -0.019         -0.184*** 
                      (0.273)             (0.540)        (0.047)        (0.025)        (0.043)    
 
Other or never 
worked/Unkno
wn            0.747    
          
1.649**        0.119***      -0.060**       -0.059    
            (0.149)             (0.356)        (0.045)        (0.023)        (0.044)    
Skill level of 
work  High 
          
0.745*   
          
0.556***      -0.099***      -0.015          0.115*** 
(low=base 
outcome)                      (0.127)             (0.090)        (0.027)        (0.021)        (0.031)    
  Medium            0.973               0.881         -0.025          0.002          0.023    
            (0.138)             (0.101)        (0.023)        (0.018)        (0.025)    
  Salary 
          
0.998*** 
          
0.997***      -0.000***      -0.000***       0.001*** 
                      (0.001)             (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)    
Income 
satisfaction  Not sufficient            1.140    
          
1.285**        0.046*         0.006         -0.052*   
("ok"=base outcome)          (0.163)             (0.162)        (0.025)        (0.018)        (0.027)    
  Sufficient      
          
0.797*   
          
0.719***      -0.057***      -0.015          0.072*** 




          
2.556*** 
          
3.118***       0.195***       0.061         -0.256*** 




          
2.325*** 
          
2.325***       0.133***       0.074***      -0.207*** 
            (0.414)             (0.356)        (0.034)        (0.028)        (0.032)    
 
Other family 
member            0.884               0.828*        -0.033*        -0.008          0.041*   
            (0.098)             (0.083)        (0.020)        (0.014)        (0.021)    
  Agriculture 
          
0.593***            1.048          0.032         -0.066***       0.034    
            (0.075)             (0.108)        (0.021)        (0.013)        (0.022)    
  Savings            1.126               0.829         -0.042          0.025          0.017    
                      (0.172)             (0.126)        (0.028)        (0.022)        (0.030)     
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Dependent : Destination Choice: EU versus Non-EU 
Multinomial Logit Model       Non-EU           EU    EU  Non-EU  Non-Migrant 
      RRR  RRR  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect  Marg.Effect 
  Rent 
          
0.658**  
          
0.666***      -0.063**       -0.036*         0.099*** 





          
1.264*              1.035         -0.004          0.031*        -0.027    
                      (0.157)             (0.108)        (0.020)        (0.017)        (0.023)    
Country 
dummies  Egypt 
          
2.195*** 
          
0.378***      -0.204***       0.170***       0.034    
(Albania=base outcome)          (0.393)             (0.059)        (0.021)        (0.032)        (0.034)    
  Moldova 
          
1.428*   
          
0.376***      -0.190***       0.094***       0.096*** 
                      (0.288)             (0.061)        (0.023)        (0.031)        (0.035)    
  Tunisia            1.280    
          
1.686***       0.099***       0.007         -0.106*** 
            (0.257)             (0.249)        (0.031)        (0.026)        (0.034)    
  Constant 
          
0.264***            0.760          
              (0.133)             (0.322)             
Number of observations  3626    3626     
Log-likelihood       -3086.86    -3086.86     
Chi-square         924.632    924.632     
Pseudo R-Square     0.16     0.16       
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in 
parentheses       
 
5  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to generate new insights for the discussion of the migration 
decision and selection patterns that occur within the migration process. The study finds that 
migrants are not self-selected in their intentions to move abroad. Rather, migration intentions, 
or pressures to migrate, arise among unemployed people or people working in lower skilled 
jobs. However, there is a strong positive out-selection when it comes to the realization of 
intentions. The findings support that this out-selection is mainly created by restrictions imposed 
by migration policies. This means that policies have no impact on the development of 
migration pressures but on the propensity to realize migration intentions. 
Further findings show that there is no selection among people intending to go to the EU 
but there is strong selection among those heading to other destinations, which refer to North 
America and Australia, countries that have traditionally had very selective immigration  
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schemes, and the Gulf countries, the main destination for Egyptians where numerous temporary 
migration programs between these countries induce a rather high skilled migration. 
Consequently, the data confirm the trend of macro data that the share of highly skilled 
immigrants is indeed much higher in countries with selective immigration policies than in 
countries with no such policies. The EU has only recently started to introduce more selective 
policies and in the past migration, has primarily allowed immigration through family 
reunification schemes.  
These findings have several implications for EU immigration policies. The data, which 
was collected in 2006, shows that the selective schemes that many EU countries have recently 
introduced have not yet been successful. Thus, the data confirm the concerns about the 
composition of immigrants of many EU countries. The reason for this may be found in the 
strong network effects, also shown in this analysis, and in the fact that EU countries have 
comparatively large family reunification schemes that seem to dominate the selective 
immigration schemes. The EU already has a lower skilled composition of migrants compared to 
North America or Oceania. As a result these immigrant stocks may induce a similar 
composition of migrants, in particular when migration barriers are lower such as is the case of 
family reunification schemes. In addition, the migration cost reducing effect found in many 
studies disproportionally affects lower skilled migrants.  
Also, countries with selective migration policies are often those with labor markets 
offering higher skill premiums to highly skilled workers. As shown by very recent research 
such as Grogger and Hanson (2008), these labor market opportunities immensely impact on the 
kind of immigrants the respective countries attract. In addition, the language advantage that 
these mainly English speaking countries have over the EU with its diverse languages, make the 
skills of migrants  more transferable to the host labor market. Thus, selective immigration 
policies in these countries dominate other immigration schemes and are complemented by 
sound labor market opportunities. 
Given these observations, it is unlikely that the EU will compensate her emigration of 
researchers and other skilled people as well as her skills gaps by immigration of highly skilled 
people. The EU has to be more realistic and acknowledge that it will take quite some time to 
change the trend of lower skilled immigration. It will also be necessary to intensify efforts to  
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fill skill gaps from within, for example by increased activity in research and development, more 
opportunities for researchers in the EU and improved incentives to get educated in fields that 
are in great demand. The EU has already started to move in this direction and it needs increase 
these efforts to reach up to its competitors. 
Also, it would be useful to conduct a more honest debate about immigrants and their skills, 
as it should not be forgotten that many sectors rely on immigrant labor particularly for low 
skilled jobs. Thus, the EU’s demand in these sectors corresponds to migration pressures. It may 
be worth looking into options to select migrants within the low skill level. For example, 
governments could identify sectors that clearly depend on immigrant labor and make 
immigration into these sectors easier while increasing barriers elsewhere. 
For highly skilled migrants, it must be kept in mind that while they are indeed effective in 
selecting migrants it takes more than the mere selective migration policies. Governments must 
create incentives in the labor markets so that migrants actually make use of (existing) selective 
migration schemes. While it is hard to tell firms to offer more attractive wages, they could 
come up with tax incentives and other privileges. Also, they could better inform employers 
about visa procedures of hiring foreign skilled workers. Another important issue is also to 
improve the recognition of foreign skills that has proved to be inadequate in many countries. In 
fact, there is an emerging body of literature that deals with so-called brain waste.
38
In any case, no matter what migration policies the EU engages in, the policies should also 
be communicated to the sending countries also. This is where people decide to move and 
choose their destination based on the information they have. The EU should ensure that people 
who have the intent to migrate know about the opportunities in the EU. If migrants keep 
thinking in traditional patterns that good education is the ticket to the US, Canada or Australia, 
it is even less likely that the composition of skills in migration flows will shift.  
 Difficulties 
in approving their skills create additional barriers to enter the country and might drive migrants 
to other destinations where they can actually perform in their profession. 
                                                 
38 See e.g. Kapur and McHale (2005) and Mattoo, Neagu and Ozden (2008)  
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7  Appendix 
7.1  The ETF Survey 
The survey is designed to represent the national population in the age range of the 18 to 
40 year-old people. In each country, a 2-stage cluster sample was selected, in which first-stage 
clusters were a minimum of 4-6 regions chosen to represent the geographical diversity of the 
country, and second-stage clusters were villages, communes or municipalities chosen to 
represent the geographical diversity of the selected regions. The detail of this cluster selection 
had been agreed with the respective local service providers who carried out the interviews, such 
that at both stages (selection of regions, and selection of villages, communes or municipalities), 
areas with high and low levels of development, areas of high and low levels of international 
migration, and both rural and urban areas were included. Initially, it was anticipated that 1000 
interviews would be conducted in each country with interviewers following random routes for 
their interviews and certain procedures in choosing the interviewee within the respective 
households to minimize any selection bias.   
The analysis of representation of the respective national population in the survey data 
was undertaken by comparing the data to other data sources from the country (Census and 
Surveys) and UN population data. For Egypt comparison with other data shows that men are 
highly overrepresented –  a problem already mentioned. Further young people are strongly 
overrepresented for both men and women. With respect to Tunisia men in general are highly 
overrepresented compared to the Tunisian population. Further, based on UN data, men are 
overrepresented in their mid 20s and women in the early 20s while census data shows 
comparable ages for men and only women tend to be younger. Education was not possible to 
assess (due to lack of comparable data) accept that the illiteracy rate in the census is much 
higher than in the sample indicating that the people in the sample are better educated. 
Also, the sample of Albanians differs from its population but not to such an extent. The 
analysis shows that men are overrepresented in the sample. The comparison of the age-
distribution illustrates that individuals in the sample tend to be younger than the national 
population. This is caused by a high overrepresentation of young men in the sample; women 
are slightly older than the national population. With respect to education primary educated men  
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and especially women are underrepresented, hence the individuals in the survey are better 
educated than the Albanian population of the respective age group.  
Representation in the sample from Moldova is much better with respect to age and gender 
and more questionable when it comes to education. Educated people are overrepresented and 
individuals with general secondary education are underrepresented. Splitting by gender reveals 
that men with vocational education are highly oversampled and that females are highly 
underrepresented in primary education and overrepresented in vocational and university 
education 
 
7.2  Tables 
Appendix-Table 1 Top 10 Host Countries of Migrants from the Survey Countries 
Host country  Albania  Host country  Moldova  Host country  Egypt  Host country  Tunisia 
Greece  403856 
Russian 
Federation  277527  Saudi Arabia  1015124  France  364498 
Italy  167439  Ukraine  222478  Jordan  127018  Germany  61508 
Germany  92415  Romania  27679 
United States 
of America  123192 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya  15689 
United States 
of America  39861 
United States 
of America  20674 
Occupied 
Palestinian 
Territory  103457  Israel  9949 
TFYR 
Macedonia  25001  Germany  14845 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya  55681  Saudi Arabia  9545 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  13451  Israel  14305 
United Arab 
Emirates  48652 
Serbia and 
Montenegro  8851 
Pakistan  8568  Kazakhstan  9531  Lebanon  45602 
Syrian Arab 
Republic  8509 
Canada  6281  Pakistan  7941  Oman  42090 
United States 
of America  8458 
Kuwait  4158  Greece  6358  Germany  40852 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo  8167 
Switzerland  3426  Latvia  6216  Italy  38706  Belgium  7995 




Appendix-Table 2 Intent to move abroad by country, N=3834 
   Albania  Egypt  Moldova  Tunisia  Total 
Non-Migrant  56%  53%  56%  37%  50% 
Migrant  44%  47%  44%  63%  50% 
of whom           
 - maybe  38%  29%  28%  45%  36% 
 - likely  38%  40%  42%  37%  39% 
 - certain  25%  31%  30%  17%  25% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Migrants and non-migrants by destination, N=3838 
Non-migrant  56%  53%  56%  38%  50% 
Other  8%  31%  22%  12%  18% 
EU  36%  16%  22%  50%  32% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 




  # of doc     # of doc     Doc_1+      Doc_2+     Passport   
Health 
record      Finance   
IRR  Coef.  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
Demographics  Age       1.006          0.007          1.046**        1.001          1.069***       0.952**        0.975*   
                 (0.005)        (0.005)        (0.019)        (0.017)        (0.019)        (0.020)        (0.015)    
  Female 
     
0.894**       -0.103**        0.844          0.796          0.887          0.644**        0.768*   
       (0.047)        (0.051)        (0.153)        (0.147)        (0.157)        (0.142)        (0.123)    
  Married        
     
1.205**        0.186**        1.880**        1.363          2.014***       1.266    
     
2.245*** 
                 (0.092)        (0.080)        (0.495)        (0.385)        (0.522)        (0.441)        (0.516)    
 
Number of 
children        0.954         -0.057          0.833          0.800          0.703**        1.077          0.887    







HHH       0.957         -0.040          1.181          0.624*         1.150          0.897          0.960    
(HHH and spouse=base 
outcome)     (0.070)        (0.074)        (0.255)        (0.169)        (0.252)        (0.315)        (0.194)    
  HH Size 
     
0.957***   -0.035***       0.870***       0.910*         0.910**        0.894          0.989    






country  Very well       0.971         -0.024          1.016          0.873          0.968          0.875          1.297*   
("ok"=base outcome)     (0.045)        (0.044)        (0.152)        (0.152)        (0.142)        (0.183)        (0.183)    
  Hardly       0.898*        -0.086*         0.715**        0.767          0.752*         1.025          0.891    
       (0.053)        (0.050)        (0.116)        (0.162)        (0.120)        (0.245)        (0.137)    
Education  Secondary       1.057          0.050          1.024          1.357          0.878          1.915***       0.982    




     
1.376*** 
     
0.289***       2.638***       2.633***       1.999***       2.174**        1.147    
                 (0.087)        (0.060)        (0.572)        (0.639)        (0.419)        (0.678)        (0.214)    
Labor market 






  # of doc     # of doc     Doc_1+      Doc_2+     Passport   
Health 
record      Finance   
IRR  Coef.  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
(employed=base outcome)     (0.061)        (0.065)        (0.235)        (0.151)        (0.238)        (0.242)        (0.198)    
 
Casual 
worker       0.982         -0.006          1.403          0.885          1.111          0.983          0.696*   
       (0.060)        (0.060)        (0.304)        (0.218)        (0.237)        (0.260)        (0.135)    
  Student 
     
0.791*** 
    -
0.173***       0.685*         0.652          0.647**        0.582    
     
0.498*** 
                 (0.061)        (0.067)        (0.154)        (0.184)        (0.143)        (0.206)        (0.111)    
  Unemployed       0.994         -0.013          1.157          0.774          0.870          0.564**        0.637**  




nown       1.045          0.027          2.206**        0.536          1.476          0.823          1.388    

















agriculture       1.117          0.095          1.286          1.480          1.421          0.951          0.976    




and repair       1.024          0.012          1.628*         0.702          1.919**        0.623          0.895    





nown       0.932         -0.062          1.092          0.700          1.481          0.572          0.688    
       (0.076)        (0.082)        (0.307)        (0.201)        (0.413)        (0.213)        (0.185)    
  Salary       1.000          0.000          1.001          1.001          1.001          1.000    
     
1.003*** 




sufficient       0.984         -0.011          1.192          0.893          1.114          0.558**  
     
0.456*** 
("ok"=base outcome)     (0.056)        (0.050)        (0.221)        (0.195)        (0.195)        (0.148)        (0.079)    
  Sufficient      
     
1.165*** 
     
0.143***       1.482**        1.237          1.631***       0.786    
     
1.558*** 
       (0.057)        (0.047)        (0.229)        (0.218)        (0.247)        (0.173)        (0.214)    
Income 
compared to 
others in the 
community  Worse       0.927         -0.054          0.855          0.844          0.946          1.223          0.887    
("same"=base outcome)     (0.054)        (0.051)        (0.169)        (0.205)        (0.181)        (0.338)        (0.166)    
  Better       0.954         -0.041          0.852          1.025          0.733*         1.215          1.350**  
                 (0.050)        (0.051)        (0.144)        (0.190)        (0.121)        (0.281)        (0.205)    
Income from  Remittances       1.055          0.053          1.255          1.297          1.186          0.975          1.262    
       (0.053)        (0.051)        (0.218)        (0.237)        (0.199)        (0.199)        (0.196)    
 
Other family 
member       1.026          0.026          1.128          1.010          1.060          0.795          0.766**  
       (0.046)        (0.042)        (0.160)        (0.165)        (0.144)        (0.158)        (0.099)    
  Agriculture       1.104          0.097          1.247          1.298          1.128          1.486          1.058    






  # of doc     # of doc     Doc_1+      Doc_2+     Passport   
Health 
record      Finance   
IRR  Coef.  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
  Savings       0.936         -0.066          0.904          0.832          0.832          1.254    
     
2.975*** 
                 (0.066)        (0.066)        (0.193)        (0.191)        (0.176)        (0.338)        (0.653)    
  Rent       1.022          0.020          0.868          1.095          0.832          1.603          1.086    




and pension       1.052          0.041          1.178          1.122          1.192          1.097          1.019    
                 (0.050)        (0.046)        (0.178)        (0.191)        (0.177)        (0.218)        (0.144)    
  Land owner       0.970         -0.039          1.009          0.909          0.826          1.198          1.465**  





conditions       0.989         -0.008          0.691**        1.066          0.664**        1.681**        0.761*   
(personal=base outcome)     (0.048)        (0.047)        (0.115)        (0.205)        (0.108)        (0.406)        (0.115)    
  Better work       0.942         -0.047          0.652**        1.090          0.643***       1.503          1.049    
       (0.049)        (0.047)        (0.110)        (0.222)        (0.107)        (0.384)        (0.167)    
  Other       0.914         -0.086          0.687          0.684          0.746          0.739          1.081    






     
0.908**       -0.091**        0.634***       0.875          0.680***       1.088          1.054    




country via:  Institution       1.147          0.232          1.803          1.047          1.160          1.727          0.881    




     
0.788**       -0.236**        0.864          0.468**        0.861          0.431*         1.160    
       (0.078)        (0.095)        (0.270)        (0.161)        (0.259)        (0.203)        (0.321)    
 
Friends 
abroad       0.913         -0.090          1.459*         0.447***       1.320          0.790          1.345    
       (0.070)        (0.077)        (0.329)        (0.108)        (0.283)        (0.237)        (0.274)    
  Been abroad       1.134          0.167*         4.780***       0.767          5.308***       0.614    
     
3.265*** 
                 (0.098)        (0.098)        (1.927)        (0.218)        (2.014)        (0.224)        (0.996)    
  Other 
     
0.773***  -0.240***       0.874          0.327***       0.832          0.388*** 
     
0.547*** 
                 (0.055)        (0.070)        (0.181)        (0.078)        (0.165)        (0.116)        (0.107)    
 
Family 
abroad       0.912         -0.086          1.246          0.506**        1.344          0.755          1.089    






     
1.169*** 
     
0.164***       1.380          1.568**        1.378*         1.319          1.441**  
       (0.060)        (0.057)        (0.282)        (0.279)        (0.268)        (0.274)        (0.230)    
 
Is aware but 
no 
participation 
intend       1.017          0.013          1.643**        0.821          2.001***       0.355**        1.663**  
       (0.062)        (0.055)        (0.387)        (0.230)        (0.465)        (0.157)        (0.369)    
Country 
dummies  Egypt 
     
0.710*** 
    -
0.266***       0.381***       0.594**        0.268***       0.101*** 
     
1.931*** 
(Albania=base outcome)     (0.061)        (0.073)        (0.089)        (0.155)        (0.063)        (0.046)        (0.420)    






  # of doc     # of doc     Doc_1+      Doc_2+     Passport   
Health 
record      Finance   
IRR  Coef.  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
1.167**  
                 (0.088)        (0.073)        (0.669)        (0.273)        (0.455)        (0.321)        (0.180)    
  Tunisia       0.972         -0.040          1.359          0.602*         1.002          0.741          1.365    
       (0.071)        (0.072)        (0.318)        (0.157)        (0.227)        (0.221)        (0.296)    
  Constant       1.019    
     
0.970***       0.649          0.806          0.421          1.369          1.614    
         (0.209)        (0.204)        (0.441)        (0.600)        (0.283)        (1.228)        (0.993)    
Number of observations  1762  1762  1762  1762  1745  1730  1760 
Log-likelihood      -1964.78  -1940.86  -860.68  -697.7  -890.99  -514.78  -989.6 
Chi-square/F-Stat       374.873  8.23  268.641  165.468  267.255  144.661  305.644 
(Pseudo) R-Square     0.049  0.1680  0.181  0.107  0.185  0.14  0.184 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses       
 
Appendix-Table 4 Dependent: How likely is it that you migrate within the next 6 months? 
Dependent: How likely is it that you migrate within the next 6 months?  
Ordered logit model (1) Generalized 
ordered logit model (2) - (5) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
    very 
unlikely   
   quite 
unlikely   
neither likely 
nor unlikely   
    quite 
likely   
     
     Odds 
Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio         Odds Ratio         Odds Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio   
Demographics  Age 
               
0.984    
               
1.026    
               
0.966**  
               
0.966**  
               
0.971    
             
             
(0.012)    
             
(0.016)    
             
(0.014)    
             
(0.014)    
             
(0.019)    
  Female 
               
0.624*** 
               
0.617*** 
               
0.617*** 
               
0.617*** 
               
0.617*** 
   
             
(0.080)    
             
(0.080)    
             
(0.080)    
             
(0.080)    
             
(0.080)    
  Married        
               
1.261    
               
1.175    
               
1.175    
               
1.175    
               
1.175    
             
             
(0.222)    
             
(0.215)    
             
(0.215)    
             
(0.215)    
             
(0.215)    
  Number of children  
               
0.877    
               
0.870    
               
1.041    
               
0.767*** 
               
0.786*   
             
             
(0.071)    
             
(0.100)    
             
(0.099)    
             
(0.075)    
             
(0.113)    
Relation to household 
head (HHH) 
Child, grandchild or 
other of HHH 
               
0.822    
               
1.299    
               
0.989    
               
0.509*** 
               
0.593**  
(HHH and spouse=base outcome) 
             
(0.131)    
             
(0.284)    
             
(0.174)    
             
(0.091)    
             
(0.153)    
  HH Size 
               
1.018    
               
1.014    
               
1.014    
               
1.014    
               
1.014    
   
             
(0.032)    
             
(0.034)    
             
(0.034)    
             
(0.034)    
             
(0.034)    
Ability to speak 
language of potential 
destination country  Very well 
               
1.016    
               
1.047    
               
1.047    
               
1.047    
               
1.047    
("ok"=base outcome) 
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.119)    
             
(0.119)    
             
(0.119)    
             
(0.119)    
  Hardly 
               
0.652*** 
               
0.665*** 
               
0.665*** 
               
0.665*** 
               
0.665*** 
   
             
(0.084)    
             
(0.089)    
             
(0.089)    
             
(0.089)    
             
(0.089)    
Education  Secondary 
               
0.969    
               
0.937    
               
0.937    
               
0.937    
               
0.937    
(primary=base outcome) 
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.113)    
             
(0.113)    
             
(0.113)    
             
(0.113)    
  Tertiary/Post-                                                                                 
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Dependent: How likely is it that you migrate within the next 6 months?  
Ordered logit model (1) Generalized 
ordered logit model (2) - (5) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
    very 
unlikely   
   quite 
unlikely   
neither likely 
nor unlikely   
    quite 
likely   
     
     Odds 
Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio         Odds Ratio         Odds Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio   
secondary  1.006     0.869     0.869     0.869     0.869    
             
             
(0.150)    
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.140)    
Labor market status  Employer 
               
0.785    
               
0.854    
               
0.565*** 
               
0.735    
               
1.011    
(employed=base outcome) 
             
(0.127)    
             
(0.182)    
             
(0.102)    
             
(0.147)    
             
(0.261)    
  Casual worker 
               
1.413**  
               
1.328*   
               
1.328*   
               
1.328*   
               
1.328*   
   
             
(0.205)    
             
(0.208)    
             
(0.208)    
             
(0.208)    
             
(0.208)    
  Student 
               
0.277*** 
               
0.298*** 
               
0.298*** 
               
0.298*** 
               
0.298*** 
             
             
(0.053)    
             
(0.057)    
             
(0.057)    
             
(0.057)    
             
(0.057)    
  Unemployed 
               
1.002    
               
1.298    
               
1.230    
               
0.723*   
               
0.544*** 
             
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.247)    
             
(0.212)    
             
(0.132)    
             




               
1.947**  
               
0.884    
               
2.086*** 
               
2.378*** 
               
2.033**  
   
             
(0.517)    
             
(0.270)    
             
(0.553)    
             
(0.613)    
             
(0.726)    




               
0.860    
               
0.579**  
               
0.900    
               
1.152    
               
0.886    




             
(0.161)    
             
(0.138)    
             
(0.189)    
             
(0.246)    
             





               
1.466*   
               
1.412    
               
1.412    
               
1.412    
               
1.412    
             
             
(0.287)    
             
(0.303)    
             
(0.303)    
             
(0.303)    
             
(0.303)    
 
Construction, 
transport and repair 
               
1.069    
               
0.873    
               
1.324    
               
1.111    
               
0.763    
             
             
(0.208)    
             
(0.225)    
             
(0.293)    
             
(0.249)    
             
(0.211)    
 
Other or never 
worked/Unknown 
               
0.887    
               
0.688    
               
0.693    
               
1.294    
               
0.785    
   
             
(0.181)    
             
(0.173)    
             
(0.159)    
             
(0.297)    
             
(0.228)    
  Salary 
               
1.000    
               
0.999    
               
1.001    
               
1.000    
               
0.999    
   
             
(0.001)    
             
(0.001)    
             
(0.001)    
             
(0.001)    
             
(0.001)    
Income satisfaction  Not sufficient 
               
0.818    
               
0.860    
               
0.860    
               
0.860    
               
0.860    
("ok"=base outcome) 
             
(0.111)    
             
(0.121)    
             
(0.121)    
             
(0.121)    
             
(0.121)    
  Sufficient      
               
1.414*** 
               
1.466*** 
               
1.466*** 
               
1.466*** 
               
1.466*** 
   
             
(0.165)    
             
(0.180)    
             
(0.180)    
             
(0.180)    
             
(0.180)    
Income compared to 
others in the community  Worse 
               
1.332*   
               
1.338*   
               
1.338*   
               
1.338*   
               
1.338*   
("same"=base outcome) 
             
(0.198)    
             
(0.214)    
             
(0.214)    
             
(0.214)    
             
(0.214)    
  Better 
               
1.011    
               
1.060    
               
1.060    
               
1.060    
               
1.060    
             
             
(0.127)    
             
(0.135)    
             
(0.135)    
             
(0.135)    
             
(0.135)    
Income from  Remittances                                                                                  
 
57 
Dependent: How likely is it that you migrate within the next 6 months?  
Ordered logit model (1) Generalized 
ordered logit model (2) - (5) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
    very 
unlikely   
   quite 
unlikely   
neither likely 
nor unlikely   
    quite 
likely   
     
     Odds 
Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio         Odds Ratio         Odds Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio   
1.044     0.950     1.506***  0.949     0.911    
   
             
(0.145)    
             
(0.164)    
             
(0.232)    
             
(0.156)    
             




               
0.603*** 
               
0.743**  
               
0.730*** 
               
0.487*** 
               
0.457*** 
   
             
(0.060)    
             
(0.109)    
             
(0.088)    
             
(0.060)    
             
(0.084)    
  Agriculture 
               
1.187    
               
1.196    
               
1.196    
               
1.196    
               
1.196    
   
             
(0.193)    
             
(0.193)    
             
(0.193)    
             
(0.193)    
             
(0.193)    
  Savings 
               
0.769    
               
0.539*** 
               
0.524*** 
               
1.776*** 
               
1.398    
             
             
(0.139)    
             
(0.101)    
             
(0.097)    
             
(0.354)    
             
(0.329)    
  Rent 
               
1.249    
               
1.062    
               
1.537**  
               
1.068    
               
1.288    
             
             
(0.213)    
             
(0.244)    
             
(0.302)    
             
(0.210)    
             




               
0.945    
               
0.943    
               
0.943    
               
0.943    
               
0.943    
             
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.110)    
             
(0.110)    
  Land owner 
               
1.085    
               
0.868    
               
0.957    
               
1.670*** 
               
1.306    
             
             
(0.176)    
             
(0.162)    
             
(0.166)    
             
(0.301)    
             
(0.291)    
Reason for leaving 
Improve living 
conditions 
               
0.862    
               
0.772*   
               
0.944    
               
0.800    
               
0.550*** 
(personal=base outcome) 
             
(0.106)    
             
(0.122)    
             
(0.134)    
             
(0.118)    
             
(0.109)    
  Better work 
               
0.820    
               
0.788*   
               
0.788*   
               
0.788*   
               
0.788*   
   
             
(0.107)    
             
(0.108)    
             
(0.108)    
             
(0.108)    
             
(0.108)    
  Other 
               
1.220    
               
1.217    
               
1.217    
               
1.217    
               
1.217    
             
             
(0.220)    
             
(0.223)    
             
(0.223)    
             
(0.223)    
             
(0.223)    
 
Migration decision 
influenced by others 
               
0.694*** 
               
0.777*   
               
0.981    
               
0.477*** 
               
0.481*** 
             
             
(0.074)    
             
(0.112)    
             
(0.127)    
             
(0.069)    
             
(0.091)    
Information about 
destination country via:  Institution 
               
1.233    
               
0.739    
               
1.485    
               
1.788    
               
3.316**  
(news=base outcome) 
             
(0.505)    
             
(0.293)    
             
(0.503)    
             
(0.650)    
             
(1.604)    
  Family at home 
               
0.776    
               
0.957    
               
1.315    
               
0.539**  
               
0.283*** 
   
             
(0.175)    
             
(0.290)    
             
(0.333)    
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.123)    
  Friends abroad 
               
0.960    
               
1.466*   
               
1.647*** 
               
0.584*** 
               
0.478*** 
   
             
(0.169)    
             
(0.311)    
             
(0.316)    
             
(0.118)    
             
(0.121)    
  Been abroad 
               
2.018*** 
               
1.820*** 
               
1.820*** 
               
1.820*** 
               
1.820*** 
             
             
(0.469)    
             
(0.378)    
             
(0.378)    
             
(0.378)    
             
(0.378)    
  Other 
               
0.688**  
               
1.047    
               
1.047    
               
0.377*** 
               
0.286*** 
                                                                                    
 
58 
Dependent: How likely is it that you migrate within the next 6 months?  
Ordered logit model (1) Generalized 
ordered logit model (2) - (5) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
    very 
unlikely   
   quite 
unlikely   
neither likely 
nor unlikely   
    quite 
likely   
     
     Odds 
Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio         Odds Ratio         Odds Ratio   
     Odds 
Ratio   
(0.115)     (0.211)     (0.186)     (0.071)     (0.071)    
  Family abroad 
               
1.682**  
               
1.885**  
               
2.234*** 
               
1.550    
               
0.789    
             
             
(0.438)    
             
(0.609)    
             
(0.636)    
             
(0.426)    
             
(0.286)    
Migration assisting 
programs  Would participate 
               
1.014    
               
0.949    
               
0.949    
               
0.949    
               
0.949    
   
             
(0.140)    
             
(0.133)    
             
(0.133)    
             
(0.133)    
             
(0.133)    
 
Is aware but no 
participation intend 
               
1.067    
               
1.189    
               
1.189    
               
1.189    
               
1.189    
   
             
(0.150)    
             
(0.181)    
             
(0.181)    
             
(0.181)    
             
(0.181)    
Country dummies  Egypt 
               
0.893    
               
0.952    
               
0.583**  
               
2.139*** 
               
0.330*** 
(Albania=base outcome) 
             
(0.170)    
             
(0.223)    
             
(0.123)    
             
(0.493)    
             
(0.110)    
  Moldova 
               
1.119    
               
1.978*** 
               
1.084    
               
1.223    
               
0.303*** 
             
             
(0.202)    
             
(0.447)    
             
(0.222)    
             
(0.269)    
             
(0.100)    
  Tunisia 
               
1.217    
               
1.547*   
               
3.494*** 
               
0.685*   
               
0.446*** 
   
             
(0.212)    
             
(0.356)    
             
(0.719)    
             
(0.144)    
             
(0.122)    
  Cut1 
               
0.087*** 
                
1762          
   
             
(0.043)        -2281.66          
  Cut2 
               
0.282**  
             
803.537          
   
             
(0.139)    
               
0.182          
  Cut3 
               
0.708            
   
             
(0.347)            
  Cut4 
               
2.941**          
     
             
(1.442)                
Number of observations 
                
1762    
                
1762     Parallel Line Assumption:   
Log-likelihood             -2607.60            -2281.66     Chi2(63)  79.07   
Chi-square      
             
350.247    
             
803.537     Prob>chi2  0.0832   
Pseudo R-Square    
               
0.065    
               
0.182             
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses   
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
This paper aims to better understand emigration pressures in migrant 
sending countries by looking at the determinants of the propensity to 
migrate at the individual level. The analysis is based on survey data 
from Albania, Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia collected by the European 
Training Foundation (ETF) in 2006. Within this context the study focuses 
on (i) the self-selection of migrants in terms of skills and (ii) the impact 
of selective immigration policies on the migration process. The paper 
finds that migration pressures, or the intent to migrate, are not subject 
to  any  self-selection.  However,  immigration  policies  exert  a  strong 
out-selection that is likely part of the reasons why positive selection is 
found in many studies. Further, the study confirms that the EU attracts 
comparatively lower skilled migrants than other destinations. 
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